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Abstract
We reexamine indeterminacy and utility-generating public spending under balanced-
budget rules in a simple one-sector growth model. The introduction of consumption
tax (subsidy) as well as subsidies for savings and labor modify indeterminacy con-
ditions in the existing studies. We show that if consumption subsidies and income
taxes exist, indeterminacy occurs even when private and public consumption are
Edgeworth substitutes and public spending and leisure are separable in the utility
function. Indeterminacy also occurs even when they are weak Edgeworth comple-
ments if consumption tax and subsidies for savings and labor are present. Surpris-
ingly, when they are strong Edgeworth complements, the stronger external eects
of public consumption tend to lower the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in
the presence of consumption tax.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that in the presence of certain of externalities or market incompleteness, a
wide variety of growth models exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy. It has been shown that
production and/or consumption externalities may be sources of indeterminacy.1 Other
possible sources of indeterminacy are public goods or services because they are typical
goods that yield external eects. In a model where public spending nanced by income
taxes exerts positive external eects on the productivity of rms, Guo and Harrison (2008)
show that indeterminacy may arise if the external eects of public spending are suciently
strong.2;3
The external eects of public spending are not limited to productivity and can ex-
tend to the utility of households, which may be a source of indeterminacy. Fernandez
et al. (2004) and Guo and Harrison (2008) introduce utility-generating public spend-
ing nanced by income tax with constant tax rates into otherwise standard one-sector
real business cycle (RBC) models and examine the conditions for indeterminacy under
balanced-budget rules. Assuming that private and public consumption are Edgeworth
substitutes, Fernandez et al. (2004) show that if public consumption and leisure are non-
separable in the utility function, indeterminacy might arise. On the other hand, in a model
where public consumption and leisure are separable, Guo and Harrison (2008) show that
if private and public consumption are Edgeworth substitutes, indeterminacy never arises,
whereas the model economy exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy only when private and
public consumption are Edgeworth complements and the external eects of public con-
sumption are suciently strong.4 These studies show that under balanced-budget rules,
1See Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Benhabib and Perli (1994), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) and
Mino (2001), for studies on production externalities. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008), Chen and Hsu (2007)
and others study indeterminacy and consumption externalities.
2Extending the model of Guo and Harrison (2008), Kamiguchi and Tamai (2001) show that if produc-
tive public spending is nanced by consumption tax, indeterminacy does not arise.
3Cazzavillan (1996), Raurich (2003) and Palivos, Yip and Zhang (2003) examine conditions for equi-
librium indeterminacy in endogenous growth models with productive government spending.
4Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008) study the same issue in a segmented asset market economy model of the
Woodford (1986) type, rather than standard one-sector RBC models. Under Edgeworth complementarity
between private and public consumption, they also show that with constant income tax rates, indeter-
minacy arises if the external eects of public consumption are suciently strong. In addition, they show
that if the consumption tax rate responds negatively to the tax base, indeterminacy is possible in a
segmented asset markets framework.
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preference structure is crucial for indeterminacy in standard one-sector RBC models with
utility-generating public spending.
We also introduce utility-generating public spending into a standard one-sector RBC
model where public consumption and leisure are separable and then reexamine conditions
for indeterminacy under balanced-budget rules. In contrast to Fernandez et al. (2004)
and Guo and Harrison (2008), we allow the government to nance its spending by con-
sumption tax as well as income taxes. Subsidies for savings, labor and consumption are
also considered. All of these tax (subsidy) rates are assumed to be constant. We show
that even when private and public consumption are Edgeworth substitutes and public
consumption and leisure are separable in the utility function, indeterminacy arises in the
presence of consumption subsidies as well as income taxes. The indeterminacy condi-
tions under Edgeworth complementarity between private and public consumption are as
follows. Even when the external eect of public spending is not strong, indeterminacy
occurs if consumption tax and subsidies for savings and labor are present. When the
external eects of public spending are strong, the nancing of public spending is crucial.
If public spending is mainly nanced by income taxes, indeterminacy arises whereas it
does not arise if the revenue from consumption tax is a main source of public spending.
As the consumption tax rate increases, the occurrence of indeterminacy becomes unlikely.
In addition, unlike most existing studies on indeterminacy and externalities, we show that
as the external eects of public spending become stronger, the model economy tends to
be more unlikely to exhibit indeterminacy under Edgeworth complementarity with strong
externalities. Our results suggest that in addition to preference structure, the designs of
scal policy are crucial for the stability of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Conditions
for indeterminacy are examined in Section 3. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.
2 The Model
We follow the model presented in Subsection 3.2 of Guo and Harrison (2008). Departing
from Guo and Harrison (2008), we consider consumption tax (or subsidy) and subsidies
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for savings and labor as well as income taxation. Guo and Harrison (2008) focus only on
the case where private and government consumption are Edgeworth complements. We
examine the case where they are Edgeworth substitutes as well as the case where they
are Edgeworth complements.
Consider a competitive economy that consists of rms, households and the government.
Time is continuous and is denoted as t  0. The representative rm produces a single
nal good by using the following technology:
Yt = AKt
Lt
1 ; A > 0 and  2 (0; 1); (1)
where Yt is the output, Kt is capital input and Lt is labor input at time t. Through
prot maximization, the rental rate of capital, rt, and the wage rate, wt, are equal to the
marginal products:
rt = 
Yt
Kt
= A

Kt
Lt
 1
; (2a)
wt = (1  )Yt
Lt
= (1  )A

Kt
Lt

: (2b)
The utility function of the representative household is given by
U =
Z 1
0

(Ct
CGt
G)1 
1    BLt

e tdt; B; C ; G;  > 0 and  6= 1; (3)
where  > 0 is subjective discount rate, Ct is private consumption, Lt is the labor supply,
and Gt is the public spending of the government. The assumption G > 0 implies the
presence of external eects of public spending.  is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in eective consumption, Ct
CGt
G . To ensure strict concavity
with respect to Ct, we assume C(1  )  1 < 0. If  = 1, then Ct and Gt are separable
and thus, the presence of Gt in (3) does not aect the dynamic properties of the model.
Hence, we restrict our attention to  6= 1. Assuming  < 1, Guo and Harrison (2008)
consider only the case where Ct and Gt are Edgeworth complements. We examine the
case where Ct and Gt are Edgeworth substitutes ( > 1), and the case where they are
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Edgeworth complementarity ( < 1).5 In contrast to Fernandez et al. (2004), Gt and Lt
are separable in (3).
The budget constraint of the household is given by
_Kt = (1  r)rtKt   Kt + (1  w)wtLt   (1 + c)Ct; (4)
where r, w and c (2 ( 1; 1)) are the tax (or subsidy) rates on capital income, labor
income and consumption, respectively. When x > (<)0 holds (x = r; w and c), x
denotes the tax (subsidy) rate. The capital depreciation rate is denoted as  > 0.
The household maximizes (3) subject to (4) and the no-Ponzi game condition, which
yields the following rst order conditions:
CCt
C(1 ) 1GtG(1 ) = t(1 + c); (5a)
B = t(1  w)wt; (5b)
_t = f+    (1  r)rtgt; (5c)
where t is the co-state variable associated with (4).
Under the balanced-budget rule, the budget constraint of the government is given by
Gt = rrtKt+wwtLt+cCt: Public spending, Gt, must be strictly positive in equilibrium.
Using (2a) and (2b), we rewrite the budget constraint of the government as
Gt = Yt + cCt; (6)
where   r + (1  )w. The good market equilibrium condition is given by
_Kt = Yt   Kt   Ct  Gt: (7)
5Many researchers have tested whether private and government consumption are complements or
substitutes. However, empirical evidence is mixed. Aschauer (1985), Bean (1986), and Kormendi and
Meguire (1995) nd evidence for substitutability. Karras (1994) nds evidence for complementarity, and
Ni (1995) nds that results are sensitive to model specications. More recently, Hamori and Asako (1999)
and Chiu (2001) nd substitutability for Japan and Taiwan, respectively. Fleissig and Rossana (2007)
nd Morishima substitutes between government and private consumption from US data. In contrast,
Ohkubo (2003) nds that the two types of consumption may be complements or may be unrelated from
Japanese quarterly data. Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) nd that they are complements from data for
European countries.
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Using (1), (2a), (2b), (5b), (5c), (6) and (7), we can reduce the equilibrium conditions
to (5a) and the following four equations:
_t =

+    (1  r)A (Kt=Lt) 1
	
t; (8a)
_Kt = (1  )AKtLt1    Kt   (1 + c)Ct; (8b)
Gt = AKt
Lt
1  + cCt; (8c)
B = t(1  w)(1  )A (Kt=Lt) : (8d)
When r = w > 0, c = 0 and  < 1 hold, our model reduces to the one examined in
Guo and Harrison (2008).
To derive the steady state equilibrium in which t, Kt, Ct, Lt, and Gt are constant
over time, let us denote K^  K=L, C^  C=L, and G^  G=L.6 From (8a), (8b),
(8c), _t = 0 and _Kt = 0, K^, C^ and G^ are given by
K^ =

(1  r)A
+ 
 1
1 
; (9a)
C^ =
f(1  )AK^ 1   gK^
1 + c
; (9b)
G^ = AK^ + cC^: (9c)
To ensure G^ > 0 (or equivalently, G > 0), at least one of  and c must be positive.
From (8d), we have  = Bf(1   w)(1   )AK^g 1. Apparently, K^, C^, G^ and  are
uniquely determined. We rearrange (5a) as
CC^
C(1 ) 1G^G(1 )L(1 )(C+G) 1 = (1 + c):
When (1  )(C + G)  1 < (>)0 holds, the left-hand side (LHS) of the above equation
monotonically decreases (increases) from 1 (zero) to zero (1) as L increases from zero
to 1. Irrespective of whether  < 1 or  > 1 holds, there exists a unique L. Then, K,
C and G are also unique and there exists a unique steady state.
6We use asterisks to indicate steady state variables.
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3 Local Stability and (In)determinacy
To examine the local stability of the steady state, we consider a log-linear approximation
around the steady state. Let us dene t  ln(t=), kt  ln(Kt=K), lt  ln(Lt=L),
ct  ln(Ct=C), and gt  ln(Gt=G). The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are
[C(1  )  1]ct + G(1  )gt = t; (10a)
_t = (1  )(+ )(kt   lt); (10b)
_kt =

1  
1  r (+ )  

kt +
1  
1  r
1  

(+ )lt  

1  
1  r
+ 

  

ct; (10c)
gt = 
Y 
G
kt + 
(1  )Y 
G
lt + c
C
G
ct; (10d)
0 = t + kt   lt; (10e)
where Y   AKL1  is the output level in the steady state equilibrium. The deriva-
tions of (10a){(10e) are in Appendix. Using (9c), (10a), (10d) and (10e), we eliminate lt
and ct from (10b) and (10c), which yields the following dynamic system:24 _t
_kt
35 =
24   (1 )(+) 0
m21 m22
3524 t
kt
35 ; (11)
where
m21 =
1  
1  r
(1  )(+ )
2
 

1  
1  r
+ 

  

1  G(1  )1  Y

G
(C + G
CC
G )(1  )  1
;
m22 =

1  
1  r
+ 

  

(C + G)(1  )  1
(C + G
CC
G )(1  )  1
:
The system, (11), includes only one predetermined variable, kt. One of the eigenvalues
of the coecient matrix is apparently negative,   (1 )(+)

< 0. If the other eigenvalue,
m22, is positive, the steady state is saddle stable and locally determinate. If m22 is
negative, the steady state exhibits local indeterminacy. If G = 0 holds, m22 is positive.
7
Without the external eects of Gt in (3), equilibrium indeterminacy never arises.
7If G = 0, we havem22 =
1 
1 r
+
  . Because of r < 1, w < 1, we have 1 1 r =
(1 )(1 w)
1 r + > ,
which ensures m22 > 0.
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3.1 The Case of Edgeworth Complements
This subsection considers the local stability under  < 1.
3.1.1 Stability under Strong Externalities
We rst consider the case where G is large enough to satisfy (C + G)(1   )   1 > 0.
Equilibrium indeterminacy arises only when
 
C + G
cC
G

(1 ) 1 < 0 or, equivalently,
(C + G)(1  )  1
1  C(1  ) cC
 < Y  (13)
holds. If the reverse inequality holds in (13), the steady state is locally determinate.
If public spending and consumption subsidy are nanced by income taxes ( > 0 and
c  0), (13) is satised and hence the steady state is locally indeterminate. However,
if public spending and subsidies for saving and labor are nanced by consumption tax
(  0 and c > 0), (13) is violated and the steady state is locally determinate. The source
of public spending is crucial for the stability of the economy. When public spending is
nanced mainly by consumption tax, equilibrium indeterminacy does not arise. If the
main source of public spending is income taxation, indeterminacy tends to occur.
To obtain further results, assuming  > 0 and c > 0, we rearrange (13) to obtain
G <
1  C(1  )
1  

1 +
1 + c
c
(+ )
+ (1  )   r   (+ )(1  )w

  : (14)
In deriving the above inequality, we use (9a), (9b) and (9c). It is shown that  + (1  
)  r   (+ )(1  )w > + (1  )    (+ )(1  ) = 0 because of r < 1
and w < 1. As shown in Figure 1, as c increases from zero to +1,   monotonically
decreases from +1 to  ^ > 0, where  ^ is
 ^  1  C(1  )
1  

1 +
(+ )
+ (1  )   r   (+ )(1  )w

:
Apparently,  ^ monotonically increases with r and w. When r = w = 0, we have
G >  ^ because (C + G)(1  )  1 > 0. When both r and w tend to one,  ^ tends to
+1(> G). Then, when r > 0 and w > 0 are suciently small, G >  ^ holds. There
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exists a unique ^c > 0 such that if c < (>)^c, we have G < (>) . If the government sets
c larger than ^c, it can eliminate equilibrium indeterminacy. When r and w(> 0) are
suciently large, G <  ^ holds and we have G <   for any c > 0. Then, the government
cannot stabilize the economy by setting a high consumption tax rate. We obtain the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose 0 <  < 1 and (C + G)(1  )  1 > 0.
1. If   0 and c > 0, the steady state is locally determinate.
2. If  > 0 and c  0, the steady state is locally indeterminate.
3. Assume  > 0 and c > 0. (a) Given r and w, if G >  ^, there exists a unique
^c > 0 such that if c < ^c, the steady state is locally indeterminate, whereas it is
locally determinate if c > ^c. (b) Given r and w, if G <  ^, the steady state is
locally indeterminate for any c > 0.
[Figures 1 and 2]
Apparently, ^c decreases with G (see Figure 1). As the external eects of Gt become
stronger, the range of c where indeterminacy arises becomes narrower and hence inde-
terminacy is more unlikely to occur. Assuming r = w =  , Figure 2 shows this result
graphically on the (; c) plane.
8 Equilibrium indeterminacy occurs in the shaded areas
while the steady state is locally determinate in the other regions. Apparently, as the
external eects increase, the shaded area becomes narrower and hence the steady state
tends to exhibit determinacy for wider ranges of tax rates.
The last result may be somewhat counterintuitive because most existing studies on
indeterminacy and externalities show that as external eects become stronger, indeter-
minacy tends to occur. The intuition behind Proposition 1 helps our understanding. We
focus on the case where  > 0 and c > 0 hold. Suppose that agents expect future public
spending to increase. Because of Edgeworth complementarity, the marginal utility of fu-
ture private consumption is expected to increase. The household has an incentive to save
8The parameter values in Figure 2 are A = 1,  = 0:36,  = 0:1,  = 0:3,  = 0:05, B = 1, and
c = 1:3.
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more, which stimulates capital accumulation. Future output will be larger, which will
have positive eects on future public spending. At the same time, capital accumulation
will raise the future wage rate. From (5b), future t will decrease. Because (5a) must
hold in equilibrium, future private consumption will increase, causing external eects and
increasing future public spending further. If c is large enough to satisfy c > ^c, the ex-
ternal eects of future private consumption on future public consumption are strong, and
hence, future public spending increases more than expected. As a result, (5a) is violated,
which cannot happen in equilibrium. The expectation is not self-fullling, and hence, the
steady state is locally determinate. As G increases, the LHS of (5a) responds more to
increases in future public spending, and hence, (5a) tends to be violated. Then, as the
external eects increase, the steady state tends to exhibit determinacy for wider ranges of
tax rates. When c is not too large (c < ^c), increases in future private consumption have
only negligible eects on future public spending. Thus, future public spending increases
as much as expected. The expectation is self-fullling, and hence, indeterminacy arises.
3.1.2 Stability under Weak Externalities
Next, we observe that in contrast to Guo and Harrison (2008), even when G is suciently
small such that it satises (C+G)(1 ) 1 < 0, indeterminacy arises if consumption tax
is present. Indeterminacy arises only when
 
C + G
cC
G

(1 )  1 > 0 or, equivalently,
G(1  )
1  C(1  )cC
 > G (15)
holds. Because of (C+G)(1 ) 1 < 0, we have 0 < G(1 )=f1 C(1 )g < 1. The
above inequality holds only when cC
 > G holds. The last inequality implies c > 0 and
 < 0. In other cases, indeterminacy never arises. To obtain further results, we assume
c > 0 and  < 0 and rearrange (15) as G >  , where   is dened as in (14). Because
  is equal to 1 C(1 )
1 
G
cC ,   must be positive. When  < 0,   increases from  1 to  ^
as c increases from zero to +1 (see Figure 3). We assume  < 1=2 to ensure  ^ > 0.9 If
G <  ^ holds, there exist  c(> 0) and  c(>  c) such that G >   > 0 holds for c 2 ( c;  c)
9 ^ has the same sign as the following equation: + (1  )   r   (+ )(1  )w + (+ ) =
+ (1  ) + r > + (1  2) > 0: The assumption of  < 1=2 ensures the last inequality.
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and G <   holds for c >  c. If G >  ^ holds, we have G >   > 0 for c >  c. We obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose  < 1=2, 0 <  < 1 and (C + G)(1  )  1 > 0.
1. If c  0 and  > 0, or if   0 and c  0 hold and at least one of them holds with
strict inequality, the steady state is locally determinate.
2. Assume  < 0 and c > 0. (a) When G <  ^ holds, there exist unique  c and
 c (0 <  c <  c), given r and w. The steady state is locally indeterminate if
c 2 ( c;  c) (0 <  c <  c), whereas it is locally determinate if c >  c. (b) When
G >  ^ holds, there exists a unique  c, given r and w. If c >  c, the steady state
is locally indeterminate. In both cases, if c <  c, G
 < 0 holds.
[Figures 3 and 4]
Apparently,  c increases with G; while  c is independent of G. Unlike the case where
G satises (C+G)(1 ) 1 > 0, as the external eects of G increase, indeterminacy is
more likely to occur. Figure 4 presents this result.10 Indeterminacy occurs in the shaded
areas.11 As G increases, indeterminacy occurs for wider ranges of tax rates.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Assume  < 0 and c > 0. Again,
suppose that agents expect future public spending to increase. As discussed following
Proposition 1, the expectation stimulates capital accumulation, thus increasing future
output, and bearing has negative eects on future public spending. At the same time,
because of increases in the future wage rate, future private consumption will increase,
thus bearing positive external eects on future public spending. When c is larger than
 c, the positive eect on future public spending dominates the negative one. However,
if c is too large (c >  c), future public spending increases more than expected, which
cannot be equilibrium. If c <  c, future public spending increases as much as expected.
The expectation is self-fullling, and indeterminacy arises.
10The parameter values in Figure 4 are A = 1,  = 0:36,  = 0:1,  = 0:3,  = 0:05, B = 1, and
c = 1:1.
11In the areas to the left of the shaded areas, G < 0 holds. In the other regions, the steady state is
locally determinate.
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3.2 The Case of Edgeworth Substitutes
This subsection will demonstrate that in contrast to Fernandez et al. (2004) and Guo and
Harrison (2008), even when Ct and Gt are Edgeworth substitutes ( > 1) and Gt and Lt
are separable in (3), indeterminacy arises if consumption subsidy is present. When  > 1,
indeterminacy arises only when
 
C + G
cC
G

(1 )  1 > 0 or, equivalently, (15) holds.
Because of G(1 )=f1 C(1 )g < 0, (15) holds only when c < 0 and  > 0. In other
cases, indeterminacy never arises. To obtain further results, we assume c < 0 and  > 0
and then rearrange (15) as G >  . Again,   must be positive in equilibrium because
of   = 1 C(1 )
1 
G
cC . When  > 0,   increases from
1 C(1 )
1  < 0 to +1 as c(< 0)
increases from -1 to zero (see Figure 5). Then, there exist 
c
and  c ( 1 <  c <  c < 0)
such that G >   > 0 holds for c 2 ( c;  c) and G <   holds for c >  c. The next
proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3 Suppose  > 1.
1. If  < 0 and c > 0, or if   0 and c  0 hold and at least one of them holds with
strict inequality, the steady state is locally determinate.
2. Assume  > 0 and c < 0. Given r and w, there exist unique  c and  c ( 1 <

c
<  c < 0). The steady state is locally indeterminate if c 2 ( c;  c), whereas it is
locally determinate if c >  c. If c <  c, G
 < 0 holds.
Apparently,  c increases with G while G does not aect  c. As the external eects
of G increase, indeterminacy is more likely to occur. In the shaded areas of Figure 6,
indeterminacy occurs.12 As G increases, the steady state tends to exhibit indeterminacy
for wider ranges of tax rates.
[Figures 5 and 6]
The intuition of the above results is as follows. Assume  > 0 and 
c
< c < 0.
Suppose that agents expect future public spending to increase. Because of Edgeworth
12The parameter values in Figure 6 are A = 1,  = 0:36,  = 0:1,  = 2,  = 0:05, B = 1, and c = 1.
We have G < 0 in the areas to the left of the shaded areas. In the other regions, the steady state is
locally determinate.
12
substitutability, the future marginal utility of private consumption will decrease. Capital
accumulation is discouraged and future output will decrease, which will have negative
eects on future public spending. At the same time, the future wage rate decreases and
thus, future t increases (see (5b)). Because (5a) must hold in equilibrium, future private
consumption will decrease, which will have positive eects on future public spending.
When c is smaller than  c(< 0), the positive eect on future public spending dominates
the negative one.13 Hence, the expectation is self-fullling, and indeterminacy arises.
4 Concluding Remarks
We reexamine indeterminacy and utility-generating public spending in a simple one-sector
growth model. We allow the government to nance its spending by consumption tax as
well as income taxes. Subsidies for savings, labor supply, and consumption are also consid-
ered. We show that even when private and public consumption are Edgeworth substitutes
and public consumption and leisure are separable in the utility function, indeterminacy
can arise with consumption subsidies. Indeterminacy conditions under Edgeworth com-
plementarity between private and public consumption are as follows. (i) Even when the
external eect of public spending is not strong, indeterminacy occurs if public spending
and subsidies for income are nanced by consumption tax. (ii) When the external eect of
public spending is strong, indeterminacy does not arise if the revenue from consumption
tax is a main source of public spending, whereas it arises if public spending is nanced
mainly by income taxation. (iii) When the external eect of public spending is strong, as
the external eects of public spending become stronger, the economy tends to be more
unlikely to exhibit indeterminacy. These results suggest that not only the preference
structure but also the designs of scal policy are crucial for indeterminacy conditions.
Appendix
After dividing both sides of (5a) by CC
C(1 ) 1GG(1 ) = (1 + c), we take the
logarithm to obtain (10a). We can derive (10e) by using (8d) in a similar way. From the
13Note c < 0. Then, as c is smaller, the positive eect tends to dominate the negative one.
13
denition of t, we have t = 
et . Note t = 0 in the steady state. Around the steady
state, _ is approximated as _ =  _t. In the steady state, we have @t=@tjt=0 = .
These relationships hold for Kt, Ct, Lt, and Gt. Then, (8a) is approximated as follows:
 _t = (1  )(+ )

1
K
@Kt
@kt

kt=0
kt   1
L
@Lt
@lt

lt=0
lt

= (1  )(+ ) (kt   lt) :
In the rst equality, we use (9a). Dividing the left- and right-hand sides by  yields
(10b). Similarly, (8b) is approximated as
K _kt =
h
(1  )AK^ 1   
i
Kkt + (1  )(1  )AK^Llt   (1 + c)Cct:
After dividing both sides byK, we rearrange the resulting equation by using (9a) and (9b)
to obtain (10c). Finally, (8c) is approximated as Ggt = Y kt + (1  )Y lt + cCct.
Dividing both sides by G results in (10d).
References
[1] Alonso-Carrera, J., Caballe, J., Raurich, X., 2008. Can consumption spillovers be a
source of equilibrium indeterminacy? Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
32, 2882{2902.
[2] Aschauer, D.A., 1985. Fiscal policy and aggregate demand. American Economic Re-
view 75, 117{127.
[3] Bean, C., 1986. The estimation of \surprise" models and the \surprise" consumption
function. Review of Economic Studies 53, 497{516.
[4] Benhabib, J., Farmer, R., 1994. Indeterminacy and increasing returns. Journal of
Economic Theory 63, 19{41.
[5] Benhabib, J., Perli, R., 1994. Uniqueness and indeterminacy: On the dynamics of
endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Theory 63, 113{142.
14
[6] Benhabib, J., Nishimura, K., 1998. Indeterminacy and sunspots with constant re-
turns. Journal of Economic Theory 81, 58{96.
[7] Cazzavillan, G., 1996. Public spending, endogenous growth, and endogenous uctu-
ations. Journal of Economic Theory 71, 394{415.
[8] Chen, B.-L., Hsu, M., 2007. Admiration is a source of indeterminacy. Economics
Letters 95, 96{103.
[9] Chiu, R.-L., 2001. The intratemporal substitution between government spending and
private consumption: empirical evidence from Taiwan. Asian Economic Journal 15,
313{323.
[10] Fernandez, E., Novales, A., Ruiz, J., 2004. Indeterminacy under non-separability
of public consumption and leisure in the utility function. Economic Modelling 21,
409{428.
[11] Fiorito, R., Kollintzas, T., 2004. Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between
private and government consumption. European Economic Review 48, 1367{1398.
[12] Fleissig, A. R., Rossana, R. J., 2007. Are consumption and government expenditures
substitutes or complements? Morishima elasticity estimates from the Fourier exible
form. Economic Inquiry 41, 132{146.
[13] Guo, J.-T., Harrison, S.G., 2008. Useful government spending and macroeconomic
(in)stability under balanced-budget rules. Journal of Public Economic Theory 10,
383{397.
[14] Hamori, S., Asako, K., 1999. Government consumption and scal policy: some evi-
dence from Japan. Applied Economics Letters 6, 551{555.
[15] Kamiguchi, A., Tamai, T., 2011. Can productive government spending be a source
of equilibrium indeterminacy? Economic Modelling 28, 1335{1340.
[16] Karras, G., 1994. Government spending and private consumption: some international
evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 26, 9{22.
15
[17] Kormendi, R., Meguire, P., 1995. Government debt, government spending, and
private-sector behavior: Reply and update. American Economic Review 80, 604{617.
[18] Mino, K., 2001. Indeterminacy and endogenous growth with social constant returns.
Journal of Economic Theory 97, 203{222.
[19] Ni, S., 1995. An empirical analysis on the substitutability between private consump-
tion and government purchases. Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 593{605.
[20] Okubo, M., 2003. Intratemporal substitution between private and government con-
sumption: the case of Japan. Economics Letters 79, 75{81
[21] Palivos, T., Yip, C. K., Zhang, J., 2003. Transitional dynamics and indeterminacy of
equilibria in an endogenous growth model with a public input. Review of Development
Economics 7, 86{98.
[22] Raurich, X., 2003. Government spending, local indeterminacy and tax structure.
Economica 70, 639{653.
[23] Lloyd-Braga, T., Modesto, L., Seegmuller, T., 2008. Tax rate variability and public
spending as sources of indeterminacy. Journal of Public Economic Theory 10, 399{
421.
[24] Woodford, M., 1986. Stationary sunspot equilibria in a nance constrained economy.
Journal of Economic Theory 40, 128{137.
16
c
 
0
 ^
G
G "
^c^
0
c
Figure 1: The Case of Edgeworth Complements with Strong Externalities
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Figure 2: Indeterminacy under Edgeworth Complements with Strong Externalities
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Figure 3: The Case of Edgeworth Complements with Weak Externalities
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Figure 4: Indeterminacy under Edgeworth Complements with Weak Externalities
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Figure 5: The Case of Edgeworth Substitutes
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Figure 6: Indeterminacy under Edgeworth Substitutes
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